INTRODUCTION
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 1 (AEDPA) provides that, except in narrow circumstances, "second or successive" petitions for writs of habeas corpus must be dismissed. 2 Some valid constitutional claims, however, do not become ripe until after the prisoner has been convicted and sentenced, and perhaps after one habeas petition has been presented and denied on the merits. AEDPA's "gatekeeping" provisions-codified at 28 USC § 2244(b)-have the potential to foreclose review of meritorious constitutional claims, and a division in the circuit courts has developed over their interpretation. One set of courts takes a "liberal" approach, focusing on pre-AEDPA common law principles and erring on the side of allowing claims. Another set takes a more rigorous textual and structural tack, which is appealing on an interpretive level but has the potential to prevent judicial review of constitutional violations. The Supreme Court has recently addressed a limited aspect of this question, and it applied the liberal approach with a pragmatist flourish. All of these approaches suffer from serious shortcomings, and this Comment argues that the textual interpretation should be followed except in certain circumstances in which that interpretation would foreclose review of a possible constitutional violation. In this scenario, courts should invoke the canon of constitutional avoidance to prevent violating the underlying constitutional right that the prisoner seeks to vindicate through a writ of habeas corpus.
In short, this Comment focuses on a very particular question, but one that could be of great import. Imagine a prisoner petitions a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus, and the petition is duly adjudicated on the merits. If she files again, this time including a claim that was unripe at the time of the earlier petition and thus not included, must the chronologically second petition be dismissed as "second or The University of Chicago Law Review [74:1475
successive" under AEDPA? Or, in the parlance often extended to this issue, should the prisoner receive another "bite at the apple" when AEDPA appears to allow only one? This Comment is divided into six Parts. Part I presents AEDPA, paying particular attention to the changes it made to existing habeas procedure. Part II surveys recent Supreme Court decisions relevant to this discussion. Part III presents the circuit split over the interpretation of the "second or successive" clauses. Part IV presents a recent Supreme Court case that partially-but neither satisfactorily nor entirely-addresses this split. Part V explains why the current state of the law is undesirable and examines some alternatives to AEDPA that prisoners might attempt to use to have their claims reviewed. Part VI first argues for a theoretical identification of rights and remedies as an inseparable unity and then articulates potential constitutional problems that come from one of the interpretive approaches to § 2244(b). A solution to this split is then proposed that focuses on the application of the canon of constitutional avoidance and the potential violation of constitutional rights in cases where AEDPA is construed to foreclose any judicial remedy for late-ripening claims. This Part concludes with some general reflections on the impact of this proposal.
I. AEDPA: A BASIC HISTORY AND OVERVIEW
The writ of habeas corpus bears a pedigree extending back many hundreds of years to the toddlerhood of the English common law. 3 The United States Constitution protects against its suspension except in extraordinary circumstances, 4 and the writ's contours have been tweaked numerous times by both the judiciary and the legislature of the United States. As a common law creation, it was governed by common law rules-specifically, a rule referred to as "abuse of the writ."both foreign and domestic, courts on the verge of impotence to enforce serious penalties-AEDPA was born.
But as with most standard stories, this one only gets it half right. Far from having a unitary purpose adapted to particular circumstances, AEDPA was a piece of long-contemplated compromise legislation passed by a divided government. Its seeds can be seen in President Reagan's 1985 State of the Union Address, 19 and some of its basic ideas were included in the 1994 Republican "Contract with America." 20 The debates over the bill were far-reaching, 21 but were held under the threat of a presidential veto. 22 Some Congressmen yearned to launch a full-scale assault on the writ; others desired no change at all. The result, which ended up gaining a fair portion of support, was clearly a hard-earned compromise, and it is difficult to say with any specificity what the unitary purpose of the bill was.
But it cannot be denied that, if AEDPA can be said to have any purposes at all, one such purpose would be to restrict the filing of frivolous habeas petitions that are disruptive of judicial finality and parasitic upon official time. To this end, AEDPA directs district courts to dismiss any claim "in a second or successive habeas corpus application . . . that was presented in a prior application," 23 and-if the claims weren't presented in an earlier petition-only to allow them under [T] his Court has sanctioned progressive trivialization of the writ until floods of stale, frivolous and repetitious petitions inundate the docket of the lower courts and swell our own. . . . It must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search. 19 See State of the Union: "Second American Revolution," NY Times B8 (Feb 7, 1985) ("I urge the House to follow the Senate and enact proposals . . . reform[ing] the habeas corpus laws and allow [ing] . . . the use of the death penalty where necessary."). 20 See Hobart Rowen, The Contract: Shall It Come to Pass?, Wash Post A23 (Nov 17, 1994) (describing Republican legislation that would curb abuse of criminal appeals and increase use of the death penalty). 21 Senator Bob Dole, a sponsor of the bill, remarked upon the proposed legislation that " [t] he most critical element of this bill, the one that bears most directly on the tragic events in Oklahoma City, is the provision reforming the so-called habeas corpus rules." 104th Cong, 1st Sess (June 5, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec S 7877 (June 7, 1995) . This stands in stark contrast to the statements of Representative Don Young, who noted that "this legislation is a knee-jerk reaction to a most heinous crime. This body has passed enough legislation in previous years to catch and punish criminals who commit these atrocious acts against humanity," 104th Cong, 2d Sess (Apr 18, 1996) , in 142 Cong Rec E 638 (Apr 25, 1996) , and Howard Berman, who stated, "Shame on those who invoke the names of innocents slaughtered in Oklahoma City . . . in their quest to effectively abolish the writ of habeas corpus," id at H 3610 (Apr 18, 1996) . 22 See Katharine Q. Seelye, Anti-Crime Bill as Political Dispute, NY Times A16 (Feb 21, 1995) (noting that President Clinton's veto pledge was his first "against a specific piece of legislation"). 23 28 USC § 2244(b)(1). The University of Chicago Law Review [74:1475 certain restricted circumstances. 24 The phrase "second or successive," however, is not defined anywhere in the act, and there are a number of questions about its interpretation that remain open. 25 
B. Specific Provisions of the Act and Changes Wrought on Existing
Habeas Procedure AEDPA is a wide-ranging act that touches on a variety of different aspects of national security and criminal justice. The relevant sections for the purposes of this Comment are those that reform habeas corpus practice. These were codified in Title 28 of the United States Code.
Section 2254(a) authorizes justices and judges to entertain applications for habeas corpus for those incarcerated in state court. It declares that [t] he Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
This section was left untouched by AEDPA. A different part of that same section, however, made the standard by which federal courts evaluate the decisions of their state counterparts much stricter. Section 2254(d) was inserted as a result of AEDPA. That section reads as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
This represents a significant change in how federal courts evaluated habeas petitions by state prisoners whose claims had been previously adjudicated on the merits in state court. The law under which the 24 28 USC § 2244(b)(2) (listing a retroactive change in constitutional interpretation as one such circumstance). See also Part I.B. 25 See Part I.C. What was eventually codified in § 2244 represents the most significant change for the purposes of this analysis. That section limited "second or successive" habeas petitions except in certain circumstances. The relevant part reads:
(b)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.
(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless-(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
27
The "and" between subsections (2)(B)(i) and (2)(B)(ii), while easy to overlook, is particularly salient for habeas procedure. Under the current statutory framework, a petitioner can bring a claim based on a new factual predicate, but only if these facts establish lack of guilt as to the underlying offense beyond a high standard. This section effectively blocks petitions based upon new factual predicates that do not clear the prisoner of the original conviction. 28 26 This refers to the time of adjudication in the state court. Before AEDPA, state courts were required to apply federal law-not just Supreme Court precedents-through the end of direct review. Except in limited circumstances, cases that had completed direct review and moved on to collateral review could not benefit from the retroactivity of "new" constitutional rules. See Teague v Lane, 489 US 288, 310 (1989) (arguing that retroactivity "continually forces the States to marshal resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards"). In order to surmount these "gatekeeping" provisions of § 2244(b)(2), a prisoner must make a motion before a three-judge panel of the relevant court of appeals. 29 If the panel determines that the prisoner's petition qualifies under § 2244, it may issue an order directing the district court to entertain the application. 30 The decision of the three-judge panel is final; it cannot be appealed to the Supreme Court or be the subject of a petition for certiorari. 31 In other words, neither the prisoner nor the state can seek to disrupt the judgment of the panel. But if the panel determines that the petition fails to meet the requirements listed in § 2244, it is to dismiss the petition. 32 The statute speaks for itself in many respects, but the scope of the changes to pre-AEDPA habeas procedure is unclear. Certain questions can and must be teased out of the statute's interstices-questions that have no clear answers from the text.
C. A Few Unanswered Questions
Once again, AEDPA does not speak for itself quite as articulately as one would like, and significant questions about its effects have come before the courts. It is difficult to say with precision exactly what changes AEDPA made to habeas practice with respect to certain issues.
First, § 2244 speaks of "second or successive" petitions, but declines to define this term. What does it mean? Does the "plain meaning" control, insofar as the phrase applies to any federal habeas petition after the first? Or is this phrase a term of art that means something else entirely? Is it intended to incorporate specifics of habeas practice that were regnant before the change? The statute is silent on these issues.
Secondly, what of the pre-AEDPA common law rules, specifically the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine that had been partially resurrected by the Supreme Court? 33 It can be contended, though not without difficulty, that AEDPA is a completely self-interpreting statute and entirely supplanted the equitable principles that courts employed earlier.
Another reasonable contention is that the tools that courts used to approach habeas petitions before the act are still valid, and that the phrase "second or successive" should be approached with the abuseof-the-writ doctrine in mind. Supreme Court decisions have not inter- 
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preted the text in the narrowest manner, 34 and the tension between the pre-AEDPA principles and the text of § 2244 remains.
A third question, and one of singular importance, is how courts are to navigate these issues without running afoul of the United States Constitution. As noted previously, the writ of habeas corpus is mentioned by name in the Constitution, with the proviso that it not be "suspended." Furthermore, habeas is a vehicle for the vindication of other constitutional rights. In enforcing AEDPA, how can judges be sure that they are not acting in a manner repugnant to the Constitution or violating the constitutionally protected rights of prisoners?
The final unanswered question is precise: if a prisoner files for a writ of habeas corpus that is adjudicated on the merits, and then she files again, this time including a claim that was factually unripe at the time of the earlier petition and thus not included, is the chronologically second petition considered "second or successive" for purposes of AEDPA?
The Supreme Court has faced these kinds of questions since the enactment of AEDPA, and an understanding of how it approached the first three questions will inform the analysis of the last.
II. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INTERPRETING
AEDPA'S "SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE" CLAUSES For a mere commentator to engage in statutory interpretation on such a microlevel might seem almost self-indulgently stale and recondite. But when the subject is a procedural mechanism "[c]onsidered by the Founders as the highest safeguard of liberty," 35 the stakes seem substantially greater. This Comment is obviously not the first inquiry into the "second or successive" provisions. The United States Supreme Court has been presented with interpretive questions about AEDPA; these cases must substantially inform any attempt to parse the act.
A. Felker v Turpin

36
The Supreme Court's first foray into AEDPA came in 1996, very shortly after the act itself was passed. 37 In Felker, the Court entertained, among other claims, a broad attack on the constitutionality of AEDPA. In the ensuing opinion, a unanimous Court held that 34 The Court then assessed the impact of this finding in combination with an analysis of a potential Suspension Clause violation. The opinion's brief historical survey of the scope of the habeas writ demonstrates that the writ's coverage had expanded dramatically since the founding. 41 Assuming that "the Suspension Clause of the Constitution refers to the writ as it exists today, rather than as it existed in 1789," 42 the court found that the restrictions placed upon the writ fell into the category of "judgments about the proper scope of the writ" 43 41 Id at 663-64 ("The writ of habeas corpus known to the Framers was quite different from that which exists today."). See also Part I. 42 Id at 663-64. 43 See id at 664. 44 50 he duly refiled once he had done so. The district court held that he must apply to the court of appeals, and that court held that the petition was not "second or successive." 51 In its opinion, the Supreme Court noted that no case had ever held that a petition like the one presented should be marked as "second or successive" merely because it was earlier dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. 52 An ominous discontinuity between two readings of the text was thus exposed: taken literally, the prisoner's claim was "presented" in a prior application, and should be dismissed. 53 But the Court took another approach. The majority noted that
[t]his may have been the second time that respondent had asked the federal courts to provide relief on his Ford claim, but this does not mean that there were two separate applications, the second of which was necessarily subject to § 2244(b). There was only one application for habeas relief, and the District Court ruled (or should have ruled) on each claim at the time it became ripe.
54
Should the alternate interpretation be adopted, "the implications for habeas practice would be far reaching and seemingly perverse."
55
Rather than taking the plain textual approach of the dissenters, the Court found a way to preserve the prisoner's Ford claim, which would not have become ripe until his execution was imminent. 56 The textual approach would also mean that a technical procedural error or misunderstanding would render habeas review by federal courts unavailable. 57 It can be argued that the conclusion of this case was driven 49 477 US 399, 409-10 (1986) (holding that "the underlying social values encompassed by the Eighth Amendment" prohibit the execution of those with "no capacity"). 50 See Martinez-Villareal, 523 US at 640 (noting that all three of the prisoner's petitions were dismissed). 51 Id at 640-41. Moving in the court of appeals is required by 28 USC § 2244(b)(3). See Part I.B.
52 Martinez-Villareal, 523 US at 644 (describing the primacy of state court remedies as "reflect[ing] a policy of federal-state comity"). 53 See id at 646 (Scalia dissenting) ("[I]t is impossible to conceive of language that more clearly precludes respondent's renewed competency-to-be-executed claim than the written law before us here."). See also id at 648-50 (Thomas dissenting) (interpreting the "plain meaning" of the statute with reference to dictionary definitions). 54 Id at 643 (majority). 55 Id at 644. 56 The execution was not considered imminent while state remedies were still available. See id at 644-45. 57 Id at 645 (including, for example, the failure to pay filing fees). The court expressly declined to entertain a scenario somewhat similar to that envisioned by this Comment-"where a prisoner raises a Ford claim for the first time in a petition filed after the federal courts have 60 but after Martinez-Villareal, which allowed for a textual departure to effectuate what the Court thought to be AEDPA's purpose. As such, the tension between textualism and purposivism that was made clear in Martinez-Villareal is reflected in the lower court decisions. In that case, however, the petitioner's initial habeas petition was dismissed for procedural reasons-in all of the following cases, the initial petition was adjudicated on the merits. When these decisions are surveyed, two general strands emerge: one that allows newly ripe claims to be presented even though the earlier petition was adjudicated on the merits and one that does not. Each will be examined in turn and later compared against the partial resolution of Panetti.
already rejected the prisoner's initial habeas application." Id at 645 n *. Additionally, this issue, explicitly set aside in Martinez-Villareal, was decided by the Court in Panetti v Quarterman, 127 S Ct 2842 (2007) , which will be discussed in Part IV.A. Another notable case handed down before Panetti, but after Martinez-Villareal, is Slack v McDaniel, 529 US 473 (2000), in which the Court reiterated its interpretation of § 2244 from Martinez-Villareal when dealing with a petition that had been dismissed during the initial round for failure to exhaust state remedies. See id at 487 ("A petition filed after a mixed petition . . . is to be treated as 'any other petition' and is not a second or successive petition."). See also Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509, 510 (1982) (holding that "mixed petitions"-those containing both claims that have been exhausted in state court and claims that have not been so exhausted-must be dismissed in whole by federal courts). The Court in Slack demonstrably declined to state that the meaning of "second or successive" would be different under the AEDPA rules. See 529 US at 486. In fact, "[t]he phrase 'second or successive petition' is a term of art given in [the Supreme Court's] prior habeas corpus cases." Id. While acknowledging "second or successive" as a "term of art," the court nonetheless failed to say precisely what the term means. But one thing is clear: the text of the Act does not control insofar as it absolutely requires the dismissal of any claim presented in a second or successive petition that had been presented earlier. 58 See Part VI.B. 59 The Court has been confronted with similar issues at least three times in 2007. In Burton v Stewart, 127 S Ct 793 (2007) (per curiam), the court held that a prisoner who filed a petition, knowing that other claims were unexhausted, could not bring those claims later, despite the fact that he may have had a "legitimate excuse" for doing so. See id at 796-97, 799. The Court also denied certiorari to a case presenting an issue very similar to the one analyzed in this Comment. The majority of the lower courts facing this issue have held that, once an initial petition is adjudicated on the merits, a petition containing a claim that has ripened in the meantime is not necessarily "second or successive" under AEDPA. These cases and claims arose in a number of contexts, but the common thread is that they were not dismissed under § 2244(b).
The Second Circuit faced this issue in James v Walsh. 61 After filing a habeas petition that was denied on the merits, the petitioner filed yet another petition, this time alleging that the corrections department had miscalculated his sentence, and that he was being held in violation of state and federal law. 62 After the district court transferred the case to the court of appeals, the Second Circuit noted the marked disinclination of courts to adopt a literal reading of § 2244, and that a chronologically second petition need not be considered a statutorily second petition under that section. 63 It also supplied a definition: "Under the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine, a subsequent petition is 'second or successive' when it raises a claim that was, or could have been, raised in an earlier petition." 64 Because the petitioner could not have challenged the administration of his sentence in the prior petition, it would be considered a "first" petition as to that claim, even though it was second chronologically.
65
The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion on similar facts in Benchoff v Colleran. 66 In that case, the petitioner collaterally attacked his conviction on habeas review, and after that petition was denied, he filed another, alleging due process violations because he was not provided with reasons for parole denial. 67 The court of appeals raised the § 2244(b) issue sua sponte and noted that the other courts of appeals have "uniformly" approached the "second or successive" language with reference to the abuse-of-the-writ principles developed before 61 308 F3d 162 (2d Cir 2002). 62 Id at 165. Note that 28 USC § 2254(a) allows only federal judges to review state court proceedings on the ground that the prisoner "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States" (emphasis added). 63 68 Accordingly, it held that a claim was not "second or successive" under the statutory definition if it couldn't have been raised in the previous petition. 69 Here the new claims could have been raised at the time of the first petition, so the district court lacked jurisdiction and the petition was dismissed. 70 It should be acknowledged that a good portion of the court's analysis is arguably dicta, but the case remains notable for its interpretive approach, notwithstanding the fact that the petition was denied under § 2244(b).
The paradigmatic case of what the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine means post-AEDPA came down from the Fifth Circuit in In re Cain.
71
After filing a habeas petition challenging his conviction and the constitutionality of his prison's "good-time credits program," Cain filed again, challenging another prison administrative policy. 72 Noting that the new petition was chronologically successive to his first, the court looked to § 2244(b) and observed that the phrase "second or successive" went undefined in the act. Stepping away from the rigid textual analysis, the opinion pointed out that "a prisoner's application is not second or successive simply because it follows an earlier federal petition. Instead, § 2244-one of the gatekeeping provisions of AEDPA-was enacted primarily to preclude prisoners from repeatedly attacking the validity of their convictions and sentences." 73 In support of this claim, the opinion mentioned that § 2244(b)(2)(B) speaks of the prisoner's guilt of the underlying offense, giving the impression that challenges to postconviction administrative and disciplinary issues were not the main target of the provisions.
74
This definition is then offered: "[A] later petition is successive when it: 1) raises a claim challenging the petitioner's conviction or sentence that was or could have been raised in an earlier petition; or 2) otherwise constitutes an abuse of the writ."
75 With this definition of "second or successive," the court held that Congress did not intend § 2244 to bar successive due process challenges to administrative and 68 See id at 817 ("Informed by the teachings of the Supreme Court and our sister circuits, therefore, we will look to principles of the abuse of the writ doctrine."). As this Comment shows, the circuit courts have not "uniformly" taken this interpretive approach. See Part III.B. 69 See id. Note the similarity with the definition supplied in James. See 308 F3d at 167. 70 Benchoff, 404 F3d at 820-21 ("[T]he District Court was required to have dismissed this petition.").
71 137 F3d 234 (5th Cir 1998). 72 Id at 235-36 ("Cain's current applications focus on the constitutionality of the procedures used to strip him of his good-time credits."). 73 Id at 235. 74 Id at 235 n 1 ("AEDPA is designed primarily to preclude petitions brought by prisoners seeking to escape the consequences of their criminal behavior."). 75 Id at 235. The Eighth Circuit faced this issue in Singleton v Norris. 77 The facts are somewhat familiar-the petitioner was sentenced to death, and then filed his first federal habeas petition, including a Ford claim that wasn't reached on appeal.
78 He again filed for habeas relief, 79 and brought the Ford claim once more. The district court dismissed the petition. On appeal the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal but remarked "that a future Ford claim based on changed circumstances was not foreclosed."
80 After this petition, he was involuntarily placed on antipsychotic medication, and he re-petitioned the district court, alleging that the state could not restore, through forced medication, his psychological fitness to be executed. 81 The Eighth Circuit found that, despite the two prior habeas applications, the petition was not second or successive. Applying pre-AEDPA principles, the court held that "a habeas petition raising a claim that had not arisen at the time of a previous petition is not barred by § 2244(b) or as an abuse of the writ."
82 Because the claim did not arise until the prisoner was put on the involuntary medical regime and had an execution date, it could not have been brought earlier.
83
Both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have also witnessed scenarios similar to those above. The prisoner in Hill v Alaska 84 had previously brought numerous postconviction habeas petitions, one of which challenged Alaska's mandatory parole scheme. Upon review the court examined a potential pitfall under § 2244(b), 85 and found it lacked bite. Echoing the reasoning of the other circuit courts, the court defined an abuse of the writ as "when a petitioner raises a habeas claim that could have been raised in an earlier petition were it not for ex- 76 Id at 236-37 ("Cain does not need this court's permission to file his two petitions because these petitions are not successive."). 78 319 F3d at 1020-21. 79 This was prior to the enactment of AEDPA. 80 Id at 1021. 81 Id at 1021-22 (noting that "the district court denied the petition"). 82 Id at 1023. 83 Id (stating that both factors had to be present for the petitioner's claim to be ripe). Note that this case contained a spirited dissent on this issue. See id at 1029 (Loken concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("This rule is a partial judicial repeal of § 2244(b)(2)'s limitations on new claims in second or successive petitions."). 84 As demonstrated above, most of the courts of appeals have taken a permissive approach to the interpretation of § 2244(b), departing from the plain textual meaning when faced with a newly ripened claim. Yet not every court has held this way. Despite some claims that the majority of courts have allowed these chronologically successive petitions, or that the courts have "uniformly" rejected the textual argument, 90 two circuits have opted for another interpretation. The Seventh Circuit has not adopted the Cain model. In the paradigmatic case In re Page, 91 the petitioner, not surprisingly, had his first petition denied on the merits and brought a second petition based on a decision that had not been handed down at the earlier time. The court wrote that the petitioner "misses the essential distinction between a dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus for technical procedural reasons, of which the most common is a failure to exhaust state remedies, and a dismissal on the merits." 92 In the first circumstance, the petitioner still has the opportunity for federal habeas review. In Page, however, the first petition was denied on the merits, and the petitioner attacked the same judgment under fire in the first petition. 93 The court characterized the petitioner's argument as saying that if there is a reason for filing a second petition-a reason why the claim could not have been included in the first petition-then the second petition is really a first petition. But this is equivalent to 86 arguing that a second petition should be treated as a first petition so long as it is not an "abuse of the writ."
94
Citing an earlier Seventh Circuit case, the court explained that the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine is "defunct" and has been entirely supplanted by the provisions of § 2244(b). 95 Allowing a habeas petitioner to choose between the older equitable standard and that established by AEDPA "is a slap in the face of Congress." 96 In addition to this argument, the court analyzed the structure of AEDPA's second or successive provisions. Noting that § 2244(b)(2)(A) allows a circuit court to entertain a claim relying on new, previously unavailable constitutional law that the Supreme Court has made applicable to collateral attacks, the Seventh Circuit panel found it contradictory that a court should entertain a successive claim based on new law if any claim based on new law would not be successive. 97 Because this seemed to be the petitioner's argument, the court denied the petition.
The Seventh Circuit held the same way in the similar case of Lambert v Davis. 98 The petitioner, after having his first habeas petition denied on the merits, filed another application for federal habeas corpus based on a decision of the state supreme court that had come down after the first petition. The court found it successive under AEDPA because it "attack[ed] the same judgment based on the same argument," 99 and because the issue was a matter of state law, and thus unavailable for federal habeas review. 100 The dissent, on the other hand, focused on the "term of art" language from Slack v McDaniel.
101
The dissenting judge thought there to be no dispute that AEDPA was intended to put a stop to frivolous habeas petitions that merely clogged the courts. 102 However, 94 Id. 95 102 Id at 780 (Ripple dissenting) ("There is no question that, in enacting AEDPA, Congress desired to put an end to the constant stream of habeas petitions that were filed successively for no other reason than to prolong the judicial process."). [i]t is difficult to imagine that, when Congress enacted AEDPA in an attempt to curb the filing of serial petitions that did nothing more than revisit already-litigated matters, it intended to prevent the redress of the type of grievance we have here-an action that could not have been known or even anticipated at the time the petitioner pursued the initial federal habeas claim.
103
Two things are evident here. The first is the tension between the Page majority's focus on text and structure and the Lambert dissent's attention to congressional purpose. The second is that the two approaches quite obviously lead to opposite conclusions.
104
The other court of appeals that allies itself with the Seventh Circuit in this area is the Tenth Circuit. In Nguyen v Gibson, 105 the court was presented with a chronologically second petition raising a Ford incompetency-to-be-executed claim. Grappling with the Supreme Court's decision in Martinez-Villareal, the court distinguished that case from the one at bar by noting that in Martinez-Villareal, the petitioner raised the Ford claim in his original petition. Conversely, the Nguyen petitioner did not, despite the fact that "all of the operative facts were known at the time he filed his first petition." 106 The dissent, however, argued that Ford claims do not sit so harmoniously with AEDPA restrictions, insofar as "a Ford claim does not ripen until execution is imminent, [thus] a Ford claim will rarely, if ever, be resolved in a first federal habeas application filed by a prisoner." 107 This case, however, is almost factually indistinguishable from the Supreme Court decision in Panetti, which complicated-but did not entirely resolvethis issue. That case will be examined next.
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: THE COURT'S PRAGMATIST FLOURISH AND ITS LIMITATIONS
The circuits were rent over this question only for a short while. But were they really? A decision handed down by the Supreme Court in 2007 ostensibly sheds some light on this question, but might be too limited in scope to resolve the issue conclusively. 103 Id at 781. 104 It might be slightly erroneous to imply that the court in Page did not evince a certain degree of purposivism, see 179 F3d at 1026 ("Such an interpretation . . . is a slap in the face of Congress."), but the contrast between the approaches is the main point. 105 162 F3d 600 (10th Cir 1998). 106 Id at 601. 107 Id at 602 (Briscoe dissenting). The procedural posture of Panetti is similar to several cases already reviewed. The petitioner was convicted of a double murder before a Texas court and sentenced to death. He attacked his conviction on direct review and through state habeas, but received no relief. After this, he filed a habeas petition in federal court under § 2254, which was denied. This denial was affirmed on appeal. 108 The arguments presented in this petition did not include a Ford incompetency-to-beexecuted claim, despite the fact that the petitioner was pretty clearly not in the best of psychological health all throughout the judicial proceedings. 109 At the close of the habeas proceedings, a new execution date was set, and the petitioner refiled for habeas relief on his incompetency claim, 110 arguing that the prisoner didn't understand the reason for his execution. The district and circuit courts denied relief, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on an unusual aspect of Ford's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 111 The Eighth Amendment claim, while ultimately determined by the Supreme Court, is not relevant for this analysis. The particular import of this case was that the § 2244(b) issue seemed to go entirely unnoticed by the trial court, circuit court, and initially the Supreme Court.
112 Not long before oral arguments, 108 Panetti, 127 S Ct at 2848-49 (2007) . 109 The psychiatric evaluation carried out by the trial court "indicated that petitioner suffered from a fragmented personality, delusions, and hallucinations. . . . Evidence later revealed that doctors had prescribed medications for petitioner's mental disorders that, in the opinion of one expert, would be difficult for a person not suffering from extreme psychosis even to tolerate." Id at 2848. Even further, "[d]uring his trial petitioner engaged in behavior later described by his standby counsel as 'bizarre,' 'scary,' and 'trance-like.'" Id at 2849. The petitioner represented himself at trial, but during state habeas review the court ruled that he was incompetent to decline the appointment of an attorney. Id. 110 For an incompetency-to-be-executed claim to succeed, the execution must be imminent. When a prisoner is attacking his death sentence, the execution is almost always stayed and thus not imminent. By their very nature, Ford claims evade review, at least in a certain manner. See Part IV.B. 111 The question upon which certiorari was granted was: "Does the Eighth Amendment permit the execution of a death row inmate who has a factual awareness of the reason for his execution but who, because of severe mental illness, has a delusional belief as to why the state is executing him, and thus does not appreciate that his execution is intended to seek retribution for his capital crime?" See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Panetti v Quarterman, No 06-6407, *i (filed Sept 6, 2006) , available on Westlaw at 2006 WL 3880284. More specifically, "the district court found based on the testimony of the experts that Panetti is aware that he will be executed, that he committed the murders for which he was convicted and sentenced to death, and that the 'State's stated reason for executing him is that he committed two murders.'" Panetti v Dretke, 448 F3d 815, 817 (5th Cir 2006). He thought, however, that the state was lying. The real reason for the execution, in the petitioner's view, was that the State of Texas was "in league with the forces of evil to prevent him from preaching the Gospel." Id at 817-18. 112 There is some contention that the issue was raised in the district court. The Court ruled that the second petition was not "second or successive" under § 2244(b). The opinion speaks directly to the state's argument that, in order to preserve a Ford claim, the petitioner must bring it in the first petition, despite its lack of ripeness.
114 Such a result, the court explained, was "counterintuitive" and "would add to the burden imposed on courts, applicants, and the States, with no clear advantage to any."
115 It concluded that "there is another reasonable interpretation of § 2244, one that does not produce these distortions and inefficiencies."
116
That interpretation derived from the one employed in MartinezVillareal, one which looks beyond the statutory text to realize the "true" intent of Congress. In Martinez-Villareal, the court took account of the decision's potential "implications for habeas practice," 117 and the Panetti court took the same route, allowing the interpretation of § 2244 to be shaped by decidedly pragmatic considerations of efficiency, burdens, and smooth petitioning. 118 The precedent of MartinezVillareal bore particular relevance, as the decision went so far as to hold that the term "second or successive" "takes its full meaning from our case law."
119 In addition, the Court found the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine to be at least still worth mentioning, and it noted that the petitioner had in no way abused the writ by bringing the Ford claim when it became ripe, and not before. . 114 See Panetti, 127 S Ct at 2852. 115 Id at 2852-53. 116 Id at 2853. 117 Martinez-Villareal, 523 US at 644. 118 See Panetti, 127 S Ct at 2854-55 ("We are hesitant to construe a statute, implemented to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism, in a manner that would require unripe (and, often, factually unsupported) claims to be raised as a mere formality, to the benefit of no party."). 119 Id at 2853 (emphasis added). 120 Id at 2854-55.
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whereas Martinez-Villareal and Panetti do. Are these cases limited to this one species of claim? Martinez-Villareal does not appear to be. As stated previously, the petitioner's Ford claim was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies 121 -a procedural shuffle that in no way related to the nature of the claim itself. The Court said this in so many words:
[N]one of our cases expounding [the exhaustion] doctrine have ever suggested that a prisoner whose habeas petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies, and who then did exhaust those remedies and returned to federal court, was by such action filing a successive petition. A court where such a petition was filed could adjudicate these claims under the same standard as would govern those made in any other first petition.
122
The rule of Martinez-Villareal would apply with equal force and manner to, say, an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a Batson challenge, 123 or any other claim that can be brought on habeas. The same cannot be said about Panetti, which is explicitly limited to claims of incompetency to be executed. The case never would have arisen without the peculiar nature of Ford claims. As stated previously, in order for a Ford claim to ripen, execution must be imminent. 124 As a result, these claims can be unripe in two different ways: they can be factually unripe insofar as the prisoner is not insane, or they can be legally unripe insofar as the prisoner is insane, but the execution is not imminent. The rule of Martinez-Villareal explicitly collapses this distinction;
125 the rule of Panetti could not exist without it. Scott Panetti was obviously insane well before he filed his first federal habeas petition.
126 At the time of this first petition, therefore, the claim was as factually ripe as it would ever be. 
V. THE UNTENABLE STATUS QUO
Any solution to the interpretive conflict over § 2244(b) will benefit from an evaluation of the arguments that have already been marshaled by the courts. None of the approaches seems fully to take account of the structural and constitutional topographies of the AEDPA provisions, and none grapples with the other arguments in a meaningful way. Before proposing a solution, the analytical methods must be examined. Furthermore, if possible alternatives to AEDPA are available for prisoners to seek review of their claims, the problem presented in this Comment might be a mere chimera. This Part will also explore substitutes for habeas relief that do not necessarily implicate AEDPA.
A. The Methods of Analysis in the Case Law Are Flawed
The two sets of circuits presented above take dramatically dissimilar approaches to this problem, but neither is satisfying. The Panetti method also leaves much to be desired. One elementary problem is this: to what extent did AEDPA uproot the common law abuse-ofthe-writ principle, and to what extent must the circuit courts favor the purpose of AEDPA over its text after Martinez-Villareal? One set of courts prefers the textual analysis, the other leans toward purposivism. Panetti puts a pragmatist spin on the liberal (purposivist) approach. Much depends on the correct answer, but neither is obviously correct. 127 Panetti, 127 S Ct at 2853 (emphasis added). 128 Id at 2855.
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The Supreme Court has given a nod to the continued vitality of abuse-of-the-writ jurisprudence, 129 but its current borders are unclear. Canons of construction are of little help. One such canon dictates that "statutes in derogation of the common law" are to be approached narrowly. 130 A countercanon is "that 'remedial' statutes are to be broadly construed."
131 It does not take a literary critic to point out that these canons can be deployed to achieve opposing results.
132 Section 2244(b) certainly goes against the grain of the common law, but whether it is a remedy or is "in derogation" thereof is predominately a matter of legislative intent and conflicting values. Because this question seems to lead inexorably to indeterminacy, it should probably be avoided. A cleaner textual reading is available.
The Supreme Court held, quite some time ago, that "[n]o statute is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its words import." 133 The Felker and Martinez-Villareal courts ruled narrowly in order to make the rulings fit with the statutory framework. The latter case, in holding that "second or successive" did not apply to a petition containing a claim that had been previously dismissed on procedural grounds, tightly worked the common law principle into AEDPA's text. Whether the words of § 2244(b) can be imported farther than that case, however, is open to doubt. Panetti appears to depart considerably from the text of § 2244(b), but for the limited purpose of Ford claims. This is the dispute that the lower courts have wrangled over.
The first set of circuit courts, which incorporate the pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ principles in their analysis, seem to neglect the persuasive structural argument from Page. It cannot be denied that the full usage of the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine elides the argument that, if arguments that rely on new, previously unavailable law are not second or successive under the statutory framework, then § 2244(b)(2)(A) serves little purpose. If claims that rely on the discovery or development of new facts-but facts that do not point toward innocence of the underlying offense-are not second or successive, then § 2244(b)(2)(B) is extraneous. As a matter of statutory interpretation, these are untenable conclusions. Another canon-the rule against surplusage-holds 129 See, for example, id at 2854-55; Felker, 518 US at 664. See also Part II.A. But see Page, 179 F3d at 1025 (observing that, after AEDPA's enactment, the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine "was replaced by the new criteria and passed out of the law"). 130 that statutes are to be interpreted such that each provision has independent meaning. 134 Statutory clauses are presumed not to be purely aesthetic or redundant. They do not contain filler.
The Cain decision, which came down in the uncertain aftermath of Martinez-Villareal, violates this canon, as well as elementary principles of textualism. It held that petitions are "successive" in only two circumstances: when they "constitute[] an abuse of the writ," or when they "raise[] a claim challenging the petitioner's conviction or sentence that was or could have been raised in an earlier petition." 135 In holding that a petition is "successive" when it abuses the writ, that decision ignores the words of § 2244 altogether. But when it holds that any challenge that couldn't have been brought earlier is not successive, § 2244(b)(2) has little work to do. The subsections of that clause make it abundantly clear that claims that are brought under such circumstances are second or successive and will be granted only in particular circumstances. 136 Put simply, Cain posits that a broad set of petitions are not second or successive. But the plain text of § 2244(b) indicates that a narrow subset of those petitions are second or successive, and cannot automatically be accepted by the district court. It is difficult to square the Cain interpretation with the statutory language, and it is unclear what lessons can be drawn from Martinez-Villareal.
The Panetti decision makes all the mistakes of Cain and the liberal approach, but throws a few more dubious interpretive methods into the mix. While that decision doesn't rely as heavily on the abuseof-the-writ doctrine as some of the cases that take the liberal tack, it manufactures an exception to the plain text of § 2244(b)-an exception that has little support in the statute. Declaring that the phrase "second or successive" "takes its full meaning from [the] case law," 137 the Supreme Court unshackled itself from any intrinsic meaning that the words or structure of the statute provide. Secondly, by mooring the interpretation of § 2244 to naked considerations of practicality-to say nothing of the fact that the point of reference in Martinez-Villareal was pretty clearly dicta-the Court transformed itself into an oversight board for efficient petitioning. Lastly, its divination of congressional intent strangely fails to pay much attention to the statute, or to 134 See Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Legislation at 275-76 (cited in note 130). 135 Cain, 137 F3d at 235. 136 Specifically, if claims "rel[y] on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable," or the facts couldn't have been uncovered through "due diligence" and the claims establish the petitioner's innocence to a high standard, then those claims shall not be dismissed. 28 USC § 2244(b)(2). 137 Panetti, 127 S Ct at 2853.
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Congress at all. Suffice it to say that Panetti is not an interpretive panacea for AEDPA's troubles. While these two approaches seem inappropriately casual with respect to interpretation, the more rigid textual and structural approach of Page has the potential to foreclose any possibility of judicial relief on claims that cannot or do not become ripe until after a prisoner's first federal habeas petition. This seems a similarly unacceptable state of affairs. In fact, because the Constitution stands supreme to any legislative act, 138 such a scenario is undesirable in the extreme. While courts have an obligation to be faithful to the text of a congressional act, they have an anterior obligation of fidelity to the Constitution of the United States. This does not mean, however, that interpretations of statutes are less valid as a logical matter, and the Page analysis bears a great deal of explanatory appeal. But, even if that is the superior interpretation, what of the possible denial of valid constitutional rights?
What potential rights might be violated by this approach? Consider the following scenarios. A prisoner is convicted in state court and files her one habeas petition of right. She has taken her bite at the apple, and § 2244(b) implies that that's all she gets. But the circumstances of her sentence could violate her constitutional rights. The disciplinary procedures at the prison could be misused to violate her due process rights, 139 a parole miscalculation could similarly deprive the prisoner of due process, 140 or even could go so far as to violate the Eighth Amendment. Violations of prisoners' First Amendment rights to freedom of religion are far from uncommon. 141 Just as children do not abandon their constitutional rights as they pass through the schoolhouse gates, prisoners retain some constitutional rights after the doors have clanked shut behind them.
Valid constitutional challenges to the sentence itself can also arise after the adjudication of the first habeas petition. For prisoners on death row, the method of execution may present Eighth Amendment The University of Chicago Law Review [74:1475
concerns. 142 In fact-though the possibility is exceedingly remote at the present time-were the penalty of death to be declared unconstitutional tout court, constitutional claims could be brought by prisoners awaiting execution. 143 But less fantastical circumstances can be envisioned. A prisoner could be convicted in an appallingly corrupt trial, though the particular facts may not be uncovered until after the initial habeas petition is duly adjudicated. 144 Further, a prisoner who does not manifest signs of defects in intelligence and ability until after the denial of the first petition could have a potential claim. In Hill, the petitioner was allowed to challenge the circumstances of his execution under § 1983 because he did not challenge "an execution procedure required by law" and a legal victory "would not necessarily prevent the State from executing him by lethal injection." 126 S Ct at 2102. It is far from difficult, however, to imagine a scenario wherein a challenge was brought to a method required by law, or that a successful suit would foreclose the availability of execution altogether. For a fuller explanation of this debate, as well as a proposed test for evaluating claims, see generally Note, A New Test for Evaluating Eighth Amendment Challenges to Lethal Injections, 120 Harv L Rev 1301 (2007) . 143 Of course, even in such an unlikely circumstance, it is even more unlikely that the Supreme Court would neglect to make the ruling retroactive to cases on collateral review. "New" rules become retroactive to cases on collateral review in only two circumstances. The first exception is when forms of private conduct are placed beyond the reach of the criminal law, and the second is for certain procedures fundamental to the American concept of liberty. Teague v Lane, 489 US 288, 307 (1989) . A ruling that the death penalty violates the Constitution would almost certainly fall into the second category. As one litigant put it, the state should not be allowed "one last cruel and unusual punishment" before the new rule takes effect. Can these be vindicated under the more rigorous textual and structural analysis of § 2244(b)? This question must be set aside momentarily. Before any sweeping pronouncements of constitutional infidelity are made, it must be investigated whether habeas petitioners have alternative remedies available to them. If so, the textual interpretation should control.
B. Alternatives to AEDPA
Despite the fact that AEDPA unambiguously controls the filing of habeas petitions-especially those that might be considered second or successive-in a United States district court, there are other avenues through which prisoners can try to vindicate their rights. Two potential remedies that require mentioning are original habeas petitions in the Supreme Court and the constitutional tort remedy of 42 USC § 1983. 147 In addition, prisoners may be able to argue for a remedy on the basis of the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution. (2003) (defining coram nobis as a writ that "allowed courts to review decisions that had previously been laid to rest" and audita querela as affording "relief to a judgment debtor against a judgment or execution because of some defense of discharge arising subsequent to the rendition of the judgment"). Despite the fact that these writs have been abolished in the civil context, see FRCP 60(b), coram nobis was briefly revitalized in United States v Morgan, 346 US 502, 512 (1954) (allowing the writ of coram nobis to issue for "errors 'of the most fundamental character'"). More recent courts, however, have been less receptive to this strategy. As Judge Easterbrook remarked, Prisoners cannot avoid the AEDPA's rules by inventive captioning. . . . Call it a motion for new trial, arrest of judgment, mandamus, prohibition, coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, certiorari, capias, habeas corpus, ejectment, quare impedit, bill of review, writ of error, or an application for a Get-Out-of-Jail Card; the name makes no difference. It is substance that controls. Because prisoners in state courts, after exhausting their state remedies, overwhelmingly petition for habeas in the appropriate federal district court, it can be easily forgotten that they still have the opportunity to file for an original petition in the Supreme Court. This point received some attention in Felker. 149 There the Court analyzed whether § 2244(b)(3)(E), which prevented the justices from reviewing the decisions of the three-judge panel, eviscerated the Court's ability to entertain original petitions for habeas in violation of Article III, § 2 of the Constitution. 150 Finding no violation, the decision concluded that the jurisdiction to receive original habeas petitions remained essentially untrammeled.
151
As an interpretive matter, the Felker court did not conclusively decide whether its approach to original petitions was bound by the 148 28 USC § 2254 (emphasis added). 149 518 US at 661-62 ("[AEDPA] does not repeal [the Court's] authority to entertain a petition for habeas corpus."). See also Part II.A. 150 Id. See also note 31 and accompanying text. 151 Id. See also US Const Art III, § 2 ("In all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction . . . with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make") (emphasis added); Yerger, 75 US at 98 (listing habeas and mandamus as included in the Court's appellate jurisdiction). Felker held that the Supreme Court is not divested of appellate jurisdiction under Article III because its ability to entertain original writs hadn't been altered by AEDPA. See 518 US at 661-62. This is an interesting logical pirouette, because habeas writs are generally considered to be original civil actions. See, for example, Townsend v Sain, 372 US 293, 311-12 (1963) ("The whole history of the writ refutes a construction of the federal courts' habeas corpus powers that would assimilate their task to that of courts of appellate review."). The Court, however, couldn't have considered an original writ of habeas corpus as part of its original jurisdiction without a collision with Marbury, as original writs are not mentioned in Article III. The characterization may be somewhat defensible, however. An original habeas writ in the Supreme Court is a review of some decision, and certain nonappellate aspects of habeas review that crop up in federal district courts-such as determinations of fact and the ability to hold evidentiary hearings-are simply not present in the Supreme Court. There is at least an argument that a state is a de facto litigant in habeas proceedings because a state prisoner is challenging her sentence in federal court, and this would allow the proceedings to qualify under the Court's original jurisdiction. The proper litigant in a habeas suit, however, is not the state, but rather the direct custodian over the prisoner's confinement. See But there is a more significant reason that original petitions may not be a real substitute for filing in the lower courts: grants of such petitions are, to say the least, exceedingly rare. The last such petition to be granted by the Court was offered up more than eighty years ago, 154 and there is nothing that indicates the court might begin granting them again.
In fact, all institutional signs point to no. The Supreme Court Rules themselves categorize original habeas petitions as "extraordinary writ[s]," the issuance of which is emphatically "not a matter of 152 Felker, 518 US at 662 (stating that § 2244(b)(3) applies only to "applications 'filed in the district court'"). 153 Id. (2002), the court denied a petition by a death-row prisoner who was under the age of eighteen when he committed his offense. Three Justices signed on to an exceptionally spirited dissent written by Justice Stevens. After noting that many laws (voting and jury service, for example) acknowledge that juveniles bear a lessened degree of responsibility, Stevens argued that a national consensus had developed against the execution of juvenile offenders. He concluded that "offenses committed by juveniles under the age of 18 do not merit the death penalty. The practice of executing such offenders is a relic of the past and is inconsistent with evolving standards of decency in a civilized society. We should put an end to this shameful practice." Id at 972. This view prevailed less than three years later in Roper, 543 US at 578 ("The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed."), which overturned the previous precedent of right, but of discretion sparingly exercised." 155 Extraordinary is the right word for it. The Rules inform potential litigants that, before the Court will consider issuing an original writ, "the petition must show that the writ will be in aid of the Court's appellate jurisdiction, that exceptional circumstances warrant the exercise of the Court's discretionary powers, and that adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form or from any other court."
156 Specifically for original petitions, the Rules tersely counsel litigants that "[t]his writ is rarely granted."
157
As categorical as this language sounds, commentators go further. A leading treatise on Supreme Court practice notes that this power to issue an "original" writ of habeas corpus directly from the Court or a Justice is so circumscribed, so rarely exercised, and so often misunderstood by untutored petitioners as to be deemed "an anachronism" in Supreme Court practice. Many habeas corpus petitions have been filed directly with the Court in past years, and an appreciable number continue to be filed. Almost without exception, these petitions have been summarily denied. It is somewhat an understatement to say . . . that "[t]his writ is rarely granted."
158
It is abundantly clear that an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court cannot be counted upon as a remedy. Suffice it to say that it is not a viable alternative to the habeas provisions of AEDPA.
Section 1983 suits.
It is possible that, as an alternative to AEDPA habeas provisions, a petitioner with legitimate claims might be able to seek vindication under the constitutional tort doctrine of § 1983. That commonly used section allows those whose rights are violated at the hands of government officials to bring suit against the perpetrators.
159 This is perhaps best described as a partial remedy.
The description as partial derives from the fact that the scope of the remedy in the context of § 1983-as-habeas-substitute has been limited by the Supreme Court. held that an action to alter prison parole proceedings that will not necessarily result in speedier release does not lie at the "core" of the habeas writ and is thus allowable through § 1983. 161 Section 1983, however, is not an appropriate remedy "if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration." 162 If the petitioner seeks to attack the imposition or length of her sentence directly, her § 1983 action can be transformed into a habeas petition and thus is not an alternative at all. As Judge Posner wrote before the Wilkinson decision, "If, regardless of the relief sought, the plaintiff is challenging the legality of his conviction, so that if he won his case the state would be obliged to release him even if he hadn't sought that relief, the suit is classified as an application for habeas corpus."
163 Depending on the effect of the prisoner's § 1983 action, the court could treat it as a habeas petition, and thus subject it to the pitfalls of any ordinary habeas petition under AEDPA.
To the extent that this doesn't allow inmates to challenge the "invalidity of [their] confinement or its duration," it is generally limited in its role as a habeas substitute. For a discrete class of prisoners, it may be a full remedy. For another discrete class, however-which would include petitioners bringing claims with the potential to prevent execution altogether-it is no remedy at all. In either case, it fails to fully resolve the interpretive dispute in the lower courts over § 2244(b). There is at least a possibility that foreclosing any potential judicial remedy for a valid constitutional claim might implicate the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution. Because there are 161 See id at 82 (finding that the respondents' claims "d[id] not fall within the implicit habeas exception"). 162 Id. 486-87 (1994) . Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that, in order to recover damages under § 1983 for unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, a prisoner "must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. 167 sketched a model of habeas corpus as a writ subject to continual redefinition by Congress. "The added restrictions which the Act places on second habeas petitions are well within the compass of this evolutionary process, and we hold that they do not amount to a 'suspension' of the writ contrary to Article I, § 9." 168 The Supreme Court has been slightly more receptive in other contexts. In INS v St. Cyr, 169 the Court held that when AEDPA, combined with the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, entirely forecloses an immigrant's right to contest his deportation through a petition for habeas, the Suspension Clause is invoked.
170 "A construction of the amendments at issue that would entirely preclude review of a pure question of law by any court would give rise to substantial constitutional questions."
171 In order to circumvent this potential collision with the Suspension Clause, the decision states that the canon of constitutional avoidance should be invoked to make a remedy available.
172 Notably, the dissent argued that the Suspension Clause does not guarantee any particular content to habeas 165 170 See id at 300. 171 Id (noting that the statutes must be construed "to avoid [constitutional] problems"). 172 Id at 326 (constructing a statute not to apply retroactively in order to preserve the respondent's avenue of relief).
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"Second or Successive" Habeas Petitions 1507 corpus; rather, the clause merely prevents its wholesale suspension. 173 Further, the canon of constitutional avoidance cannot be invoked to ignore the statute and, in effect, create a new one. 174 Three days after the decision in St. Cyr was handed down, the court decided Zadvydas v Davis. 175 In that case, the Court again supplied an extratextual remedy to sidestep constitutional difficulty. In interpreting an alien removal statute that ostensibly shut the door on habeas relief and allowed the indefinite detention of an alien, the Court found an implicit "reasonable time" limitation in the statute. 176 As a result, the statute was saved from a potential Due Process violation. 177 But, once again, the dissent didn't think so. The counterargument to the avoidance canon was marshaled in full force, alleging that the canon applies only to two equally plausible interpretations of a statute, and that the winning interpretation can't flout congressional intent. 178 According to this argument, "[t]he requirement the majority reads into the law simply bears no relation to the text; and in fact it defeats the statutory purpose and design." 179 But these cases considered AEDPA in conjunction with other statutes, which heightened the level of constitutional questionability. It seems all but concluded that any Suspension Clause challenge to § 2244(b) in isolation fails to pass jurisprudential muster. However, this doesn't necessarily mean that the section is blissfully free of constitutional infirmity.
VI. TOWARDS A RESOLUTION
Every method taken by the courts-Cain's liberal approach, Panetti's pragmatist twist thereupon, and Page's rigid focus on text and structure-is inadequate. The first two deviate from AEDPA's text to an unacceptable extent; the last risks denial of review of meritorious claims, and the foreclosure of any remedy. This Part answers two questions. First, does barring a remedy for a potential constitutional right violate the right itself? Second, if so, what are courts to do in such a situation?
A. Foreclosed Remedies and Constitutional Rights
The issue considered here is one of vindication of rights through remedies. A preliminary objection must be addressed before traveling any further. It may be contended that we need not worry about an inadequate or empty remedy, as this would merely signal that the potentially meritorious right is "underenforced" in this context. 183 The outline of the right is discernable; courts apply it with ease in many situations. The fact of underenforcement for convicted prisoners who have already had one habeas petition adjudicated on the merits shouldn't cause too much turmoil, as rights and remedies-while related-are not a unity.
This outlook is not uncommon in academic circles. Some scholars have a propensity to speak of rights and remedies as if they inhabit two different planets-the former lounging in the Platonic world of forms, the latter holing up in the practical but cluttered corners of frantic courtrooms. One commentator notes, for example, that [ is not] a one-way ratchet that enshrines in the Constitution every grant of habeas jurisdiction."). Of course, a middle ground can be found between the Suspension Clause as a ratchet and the Suspension Clause as nothing other than a guarantee against full suspension. Scalia also expresses a view that the Suspension Clause pertains to only temporary abatements of the writ and nothing else. Id at 337-41 (noting that, in the case at issue, "Congress [had] not temporarily withheld operation of the writ, but [had] permanently altered its content"). 182 [i]t is part of the intellectual fabric of constitutional law and its jurisprudence that there is an important distinction between a statement which describes an ideal which is embodied in the Constitution and a statement which attempts to translate such an ideal into a workable standard for the decision of concrete issues.
184
But the two cannot be so cleanly separated. This Comment takes the view that "[r]ights are often shaped by the nature of the remedy that will follow if the right is violated." 185 In order to fully understand the right, we must examine the remedy. 186 One counterpoint here might be the existence of important-looking constitutional text that has begotten no or very few remedies-such as the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 187 This, however, slightly misstates the approach. Rights do not entail remedies as a descriptive matter, insofar as for every right, there is a corresponding remedy. They entail remedies as a matter of definition. 188 For all intents and purposes, the Privileges or Immunities Clause can scarcely be considered a part of the Constitution.
While this view may initially look radical, it bears a pedigree extending far into our jurisprudential tradition. Some of the most luminous stars in the Anglo-American judicial cynosure have been skeptical of the right-remedy division. William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, 189 opined that "it is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded." 190 Later, The University of Chicago Law Review [74:1475
Learned Hand remarked that "a right without any remedy is a meaningless scholasticism." 191 Oliver Wendell Holmes famously opined that " [t] he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." 192 Thus, it is purely idealistic to speak of "law" apart from its enforcement. "[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court;-and so of a legal right."
193
Scholars associated with the legal realist school have added to these general ideas. Karl Llewellyn echoed Holmes when he mentioned that "[w]hat [legal] officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself." 194 Even more explicitly, he described the "cynic[al]" view as holding that a right is best measured by effects in life. Absence of remedy is absence of right. Defect of remedy is defect of right. A right is as big, precisely, as what the courts will do. The differentiation between substantive law and adjective law is an illusion, although the prevalence of this illusion (as of any other) has results in human behavior, and must be taken account of. What the idealist calls substantive rights are not things, not even shadowy things; they are purposes the legal officials have set themselves: to get you to perform your agreement, to keep you off my land. But the law can be seen only in its effects.
195
Despite the pejorative connotation of the word "cynics," Llewellyn confesses that he is intellectually allied with them. Outside of the academic world, Supreme Court precedent also confirms that some remedy must be made available for the denial of a constitutional right. 196 All this intellectual firepower leads to a very basic point. A constitutional right necessarily implies a remedy or it is undeserving of the name. If a constitutional right is not enforced by the courts, it either is not a right or it is a violation of constitutional text. As applied to the disagreement in the circuit courts, this principle dictates the
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conclusion that the interpretation of § 2244(b) as articulated in Cain is hermeneutically inadequate. 197 While it can't be said that the pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ interpretive arsenal is completely unavailable, the structural errors of that approach do not withstand scrutiny. However, the Page approach that properly accounts for the text and structure of the statute could vitiate and thus violate the Constitution. As such, neither can be considered an acceptable solution to the problem of § 2244(b).
B. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance As described above, the Cain approach to § 2244(b) is textually promiscuous. The Page interpretation, in contrast, might pose serious constitutional questions in certain circumstances, which are not limited to those contemplated in Part V.A. The contours of this dilemma are not new to the courts. In fact, scholars and judges regularly rely on an interpretive goodie bag to deal with such quandaries. One such tool is the "canon of constitutional avoidance." 198 Louis Brandeis characterized it like this:
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. . . . Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter." 199 The University of Chicago Law Review [74:1475 the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." 200 It cannot be denied, however, that neither AEDPA's text nor its legislative history speaks volumes about Congress's intent, and it is thus not at all clear what that intent is. Can it be said that the Fifth Circuit's interpretation in Cain is "plainly contrary" to the will of Congress? Here, Congress is not silent; it is just ambiguous. As the Supreme Court indelicately put it, "in a world of silk purses and pigs' ears, [AEDPA] is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting." 201 Also, as described above, whether AEDPA can be said to have a coherent purpose at all is far from clear. As such, it cannot be stated with great confidence that any interpretation-aside from those leading to patently absurd conclusions-is consonant with AEDPA's intent. The text is more or less all we have, and a straightforward reading of the text leads to potential constitutional problems in certain circumstances.
Courts should employ the canon of constitutional avoidance to revitalize pre-AEDPA principles as articulated in the courts following Cain. While the Cain method may be textually unfaithful-perhaps led astray by the uncertainty resulting from Martinez-Villareal-it does not lead to the foreclosure of review of constitutional rights, and the outcome can be tightened significantly. But if it fails to give effect to an act of Congress, it violates the Constitution. Textually unwarranted conclusions are not unprecedented in habeas jurisprudence, 200 Council, 485 US 568, 575 (1988) . See also Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Legislation at 360-67 (cited in note 130) (detailing the canon of constitutional avoidance). Scholars have identified at least two separate strains of this canon. The first is deemed "classical avoidance," which posits that when a court is presented with two possible interpretations of an act, one constitutional and the other not, the constitutional reading should prevail. The other is deemed "modern avoidance." This is the formulation of DeBartolo. See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 Colum L Rev 1189, 1202-04 (2006) ("The critical difference between classical and modern avoidance . . . is in the level of constitutional concern needed to trigger the rule."); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 Georgetown L J 1945, 1948-49 (1997) ("The basic difference between classical and modern avoidance is that the former requires the court to determine that one plausible interpretation of the statute would be unconstitutional, while the latter requires only a determination that one plausible reading might be unconstitutional."). The canon of constitutional avoidance, as discussed in this Comment, refers to the modern version. This is because it is not necessarily the case that the Cain set of courts presents an acceptable construction of AEDPA and the Page set presents an unconstitutional construction. Rather, the interpretation of the latter set of courts raises serious constitutional questions, and the former employs a questionable interpretive method. The tidiness envisioned by the classical version of the canon is simply not present here. This canon is not fully free from difficulty and can come into conflict with other interpretive methods. See id at 1946 (explicating a "severe reciprocal tension" between the canon of constitutional avoidance and the doctrine of severability). For a critique of the canon, see Schauer, 1995 fers. 207 It is therefore important to place limits on the reach of the canon's application.
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp v Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades
Contrary to Cain, the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine is not fully resurrected. Petitioners who bring a claim in a second petition that could have been brought in the initial petition should be denied relief-it is not enough that they profess a reason for neglecting to bring it the first time. Only when a claim could not have been brought for lack of ripeness should the statutory text be ignored, and when foreclosure of review could lead to a violation of the underlying right by denying any possible judicial avenue for relief. This principle interacts with § 2244(b) in two ways. First, if a new rule of constitutional law is promulgated by the Supreme Court but not made retroactive to cases on collateral review, 208 petitions should be allowed only when the decision makes it clear that a right could be violated if habeas review is cut off. Second, if a new factual predicate that was previously undiscoverable arises, but does not go to full innocence, the claim should be reviewed if a constitutional right would otherwise be violated. Note that these petitions are still "second or successive," § 2244(b) has been merely overridden in these peculiar circumstances to leave its constitutionality undisturbed.
If a second petition is allowed under this framework, the petitioner must bring all claims that are ripe at that time or risk losing them under the "modified res judicata" rule of abuse of the writ that has been partially disinterred. The most essential point is that a prisoner cannot use this approach for needless delay-it emphatically is not a jurisprudential snooze button that can be used to put off finality. This approach will partially preserve the textual and structural analysis from Page, except in the cases when doing so would result in a constitutional violation. Furthermore, it will allow potentially meritorious claims to reach the federal courts, and in so doing will curtail dilatory petitions and preserve judicial resources. Lastly, it will encourage petitioners to bring all their available claims in their initial petitions, but leave them secure in the knowledge that, if a legitimate claim were to ripen, review would not be foreclosed. 207 For an example that poses the danger of potentially rootless interpretation, see Church of the Holy Trinity v United States, 143 US 457, 459 (1892) ("It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."). Panetti's interpretation of § 2244 arguably applies this doctrine. 208 Again, Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989), demands that certain types of cases automatically be made retroactive to cases on collateral review. Id at 307. See also note 143. But the Teague exceptions are manipulable and vague, and it's not out of the question that important rulings will not be made per se retroactive to cases that have completed direct review and passed into the collateral stages. AEDPA was passed by a divided government and under the threat of veto-as a result, the idea that it has a unitary and identifiable purpose is somewhat hard to defend. Its "gatekeeping" provisions prevent prisoners from filing petitions for habeas corpus that can be tagged as "second or successive," but this term goes undefined in the statutory text and has the potential to block legitimate attempts to seek habeas review.
A circuit split has developed over the interpretation of this section in the wake of Martinez-Villareal, with one group of courts applying the pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ principles and the other relying more on the text and structure of the statute. The recent case of Panetti resolves this issue with respect to Ford claims, but its scope is limited and its hermeneutic principles unsound. Both approaches taken by the circuit courts are unsatisfying-one ignores the statutory text, and the other could stand in the way of a prisoner's obtaining redress for a real constitutional harm. This Comment advocates using the canon of constitutional avoidance to remain faithful to the statutory text unless it would foreclose review of potential constitutional violations. In so doing, this approach avoids an uncompromising textualism that could deprive petitioners of a meaningful day in federal court, and also a wanton throwback to common law principles that ignore the plain import of the text. In the vast majority of cases, both can coexist. But when they cannot, it is AEDPA that must yield to habeas review, and not the other way around.
